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What is known about this topic
• Since 2009, people who lack
capacity to consent to a direct
payment (DP) may still receive
their social care funding in this
way.
• Assessing a person’s capacity to
make a decision is not
straightforward.
What this paper adds
• This paper deﬁnes a DP for a
person who lacks capacity as an
‘indirect’ payment.
• It identiﬁes and describes ﬁve key
decision-making stages in
arranging an ‘indirect’ payment.
• While understanding of how to
apply the Mental Capacity Act
guidelines to these decisions was
well described, there appeared to
be gaps in their application in
practice.
Abstract
This paper reports ﬁndings from a study that aimed to explore how
practitioners were bringing together the demands of the personalisation
agenda, in particular the offer of direct payments (DPs), with the Mental
Capacity Act, and to investigate current practices of offering and
administering indirect payments for people who lack capacity to consent
to them, including the use of ‘suitable person’ proxies under the new
regulations (DH, 2009). The study adopted a qualitative interview-based
design; participants were social work practitioners (67) and recipients of
‘indirect’ payments (18) in six local authorities in England in 2011–2012.
The paper reports on ﬁve key decision-making points in the indirect
payments process: the decision to take on an indirect payment, the
assessment of mental capacity, the identiﬁcation of a suitable person, the
establishment of the care recipient’s best interests and the decisions about
how to execute the indirect payment. We found that practitioners and
suitable people had different experiences of the system, although in both
cases, there was overarching support for the beneﬁts of enabling people
who lack capacity to consent to a DP to receive their social care funding
in the form of an ‘indirect’ payment via a proxy suitable person.
Keywords: direct payments, learning disabilities and dementia, mental
capacity, personalisation
Introduction
Since 1996, ‘direct payments’ (DPs) have been a cen-
tral plank in the moves towards personalising social
care in the UK, although the policy has met with
mixed reactions (Glasby & Littlechild 2009, p. 19),
being welcomed by disabled activists (Hasler et al.
1999), while being critiqued as the start of the erosion
of the welfare state. This tension is reﬂected in the
debates about personalisation generally (Houston
2010) and has arguably been exacerbated by austerity
measures and cuts in social care budgets (Williams
et al. 2014a). Therefore, a critical view of DPs
must always have an eye both on the beneﬁts of
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independence, as well as on the difﬁculties and the
demands made on individuals.
In the context of English policy and forthcoming
legislation (Great Britain, 2014), DPs are one option
for adult social care users who have a ‘personal bud-
get’ (Carr 2009). They can also choose directly pro-
vided services from the local authority, and can buy
in support from an agency or organisation. This
apparently simple system has however many com-
plexities, as effectively a personal budget is a ‘condi-
tional resource entitlement’ (Duffy et al. 2010). The
state offers personal budgets to people who are enti-
tled by virtue of their level of ‘need’ and who can
plan how best to spend their budget to achieve out-
comes that are approved by the state.
There are therefore several tensions inherent in the
rhetorical driver behind DPs, which is the notion of
‘choice and control’ for the individual DP user:
There is solid evidence that care is less effective if people
feel they are not in control. A fundamental aim is to make
the actions and choices of people who use services the driv-
ers of improvement. (DH 2006, p. 1.5)
As such, DP policy has depended on and assumed
the notion of the individual user as an autonomous
citizen (Beresford 2001), and it is this same notion
which now lies behind the wider personalisation
agenda. Those in receipt of personal budgets should
all experience ‘choice and control’ and one of those
choices is whether to use their budget in the form of
a DP. Commentary on the monitoring of personal
budgets (Slasberg et al. 2012) suggests that it is DPs,
rather than personal budgets themselves, that make a
positive difference to people’s outcomes. However,
there are tensions, particularly as the proportion of
disabled people in receipt of social care has been nar-
rowed by eligibility criteria (DH 2010) to those with
the highest levels of ‘need’. Questions then arise
about the capacity of some individuals with cognitive
limitations to take control for themselves (Dowse
2009, Lymbery 2012).
The apparent contradiction between ‘capacity’ and
personalisation has become more prominent since the
Mental Capacity Act (the MCA) that came into force
in England and Wales in 2007. While the MCA pro-
motes the principle that each person should be
assumed to have capacity, it also gives a legal frame-
work for making a decision on behalf of an individ-
ual assessed as lacking capacity to do so (Boyle et al.
2012, Williams et al. 2014b). However, autonomy in
making a decision should not be confused with the
ability to implement that decision in action (Boyle
2008). Leece and Peace (2010) helpfully unravel some
of the conﬂicting ideas about independence and
autonomy, focusing on a ‘rational-voluntarist’ view
of autonomy, which they describe as ‘control in prin-
ciple’. As they argue:
Its explanation of autonomy encompasses people with cog-
nitive disabilities who rely on the judgement of others to
make decisions. (p. 1851)
It is this perception of control and autonomy
which underpins the new provisions, reﬂected in the
Health and Social Care Act in 2008, and in subse-
quent guidance (DH 2009). If a disabled person is
considered to lack capacity to consent to make a deci-
sion about a DP, then there is now the opportunity to
appoint a ‘suitable person’ to receive and manage the
payments on their behalf. Rather than deny groups of
people the beneﬁts of a DP, this legislation and guid-
ance allows them to have the type of relational auton-
omy, where another person in their life can make the
signiﬁcant decisions about a DP for them.
This paper is based on a study that examined how
these provisions were being put into practice in Eng-
land during 2011–2012. The aims of the study were:
• to ﬁnd out how DPs were being administered for
people who lack capacity, by taking into account
the views of various stakeholders including staff
who inﬂuence decisions about DPs (e.g. care man-
agers, brokers, advocates, ﬁnance managers) and
suitable persons managing the DP of a person
without capacity.
• to see how practitioners were bringing together
the demands of the personalisation agenda, in par-
ticular the offer of DPs, with the MCA.
• to investigate the current practices of offering and
administering DPs for people who lack capacity to
consent to them, including the use of ‘suitable per-
son’ proxies under the new regulations (DH 2009).
As the DPs in this study were managed by a third
party (the suitable person), this paper refers to them
throughout as ‘indirect payments’.
Method
The study employed a qualitative methodology, with
data generated from semi-structured interviews with
social work practitioners and people who were in
receipt of an indirect payment. The study purposively
sampled six English local authorities, aiming to
recruit a diverse sample with rural/urban and north/
south distributions. We recruited one city, four
county and one borough council. Once an authority
agreed to participate, an email was sent to all practi-
tioners identiﬁed by the authority as having experi-
ence of DPs. This email invited practitioners to
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contact a member of the research team directly if they
were prepared to consider being interviewed. Those
who responded to were provided with a copy of the
project information leaﬂet, and asked to complete
and return a consent form directly to the research
team before an interview was arranged. Conse-
quently, to preserve anonymity, authorities did not
know which practitioners had consented to partici-
pate in the research.
In order to access people who received an indirect
payments package on behalf of a person who lacked
capacity, participating practitioners forwarded the
research materials to relevant people, inviting them
to contact the research team if they were prepared to
consider participation. Those who responded were
provided with a study information sheet and com-
pleted a consent form prior to being interviewed. The
suitable people identiﬁed were not necessarily part of
the identifying practitioner’s caseload.
Interviews were undertaken face to face or by tele-
phone. The study was reviewed and given formal
approval by the Social Care Research Ethics commit-
tee (11/IEC08/0018, 15 June 2011), and the Associa-
tion of Directors in Adult Social Services research
group (RG11-007, 4 July 2011).
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.
Transcripts were read in full by the ﬁrst two authors
to gain an overall perspective of the data, and the
team agreed on an initial coding framework. Tran-
scripts were uploaded to Nvivo 9 and categorised
according to the role of respondent (practitioner or
suitable person), the nature of impairment of the per-
son lacking capacity and the local authority area. Cat-
egorising the data in this way made it possible to
compare and contrast the viewpoints of different
respondents. Following a line-by-line reading of each
transcript, the authors developed thematic codes
which were discussed and agreed among the team.
Several overarching themes cut across the coding
framework, and it is one of those themes – decision-
making – that forms the basis for the current paper.
In the subsequent section, analytic points are illus-
trated with quotes, labelled either ‘P’ if from social
work practitioners, or ‘SP’ from suitable people.
Findings
This paper is structured around ﬁve decision-making
moments in the indirect payments process. The chro-
nology of these moments is far from clear, and in
practice they do not necessarily need to happen in
sequence. Therefore, we simply follow the 2009
Guidance, starting from the decision to take up a DP,
and moving on through the assessment of capacity,
selection of the suitable person, the consideration of
best interests of the person who lacks capacity to con-
sent and the execution of the indirect payment. The
ﬁndings are based on interviews with 67 social work
practitioners: a mixture of case-carrying, senior man-
agement and strategic level staff, from 6 local authori-
ties in England, and a further 18 individuals (from 3
of the 6 authorities) who received an indirect pay-
ments package on behalf of a person who lacked
capacity.
The decision to take up an indirect payment
Helping to achieve targets
Since 2001, practitioners have been required to offer a
DP to every new social care recipient. Several of the
practitioners we spoke to said that they felt pressure
from their local authority to encourage people to
choose a DP. This was typically perceived as being
because of a need to achieve targets as this practi-
tioner explained:
. . .our areas got one of the very, very lowest uptakes of
direct payments . . . there’s a massive amount of pressure
on workers now . . . you need to push hard to get a direct
payment, ‘cos it’s a performance indicator. (P15)
As a consequence, from the point of view of prac-
titioners, indirect payments were perceived as one
way of increasing the numbers of people using DPs.
Avoiding restrictive social care provision
Discussing this issue with the suitable people them-
selves, the picture appeared more complex. Although
in two cases, suitable people acknowledged that a
social worker had initially broached the subject of a
DP, more commonly, suitable people perceived them-
selves as being proactive in seeking out the best solu-
tion from the local authority. Suitable people most
commonly chose an indirect payment because of the
outcome they wanted for their relative or friend. For
instance, previous or alternative arrangements had
been restrictive or inﬂexible, as this person explained:
Sometimes the [agency] carers’d come 10 minutes late,
they’d say, I’m sorry but I’ve had to get Mrs so-and-so
ready to go into respite. (SP7)
The parent of a man with learning disabilities
(SP9) described how services had been inadequate to
meet her relative’s needs, and that her priority was to
take him out of residential care. As she understood it,
the only way to achieve this aspiration was through
an indirect payment. The daughter of a woman with
dementia, similarly, said that her mother had been in
a care home for 10 months:
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I felt so awful every time I left her, because she was put to
bed at half-past three. And my Mum . . . was a head teacher
of a school. She’s an author of books. She’s a highly intelli-
gent person, and she was being put to bed at, at half-past
three. (SP6)
Several other suitable people described how the
only option previously available involved a move to
residential care, an option that they all wished to
avoid for their relative(s), and they believed that an
indirect payment was the only way to do so. As one
suitable person described, an indirect payment was
‘the only game in town’ (SP5) with no viable alterna-
tive available.
Involving the social care recipient in the decision about an
indirect payment
Although there are scant data about how the social
care recipients themselves might have been involved
in the decision about indirect payments, both the
MCA’s code of practice (Department for Constitu-
tional Affairs 2007) and the 2009 regulations (DH
2009) encourage practitioners to consult with the per-
son lacking capacity. Where the involvement of the
person was described, it was most commonly in situa-
tions when they had expressed a wish not to receive
a DP in their own name. A suitable person, who
receives an indirect payment on behalf of her daugh-
ter, a woman with a mild learning disability,
described her attitude at the time she moved to adult
services and thus became entitled to receive a DP:
But [name] is very, very clear that she doesn’t want to go
there, and wishes us to do it for her. (SP5)
As this woman is able to express a desire not to
operate a DP herself, we may well question whether
she actually does lack capacity to consent. This opens
up the ﬁrst area of difﬁculty in offering a DP to an
individual, as there was a blurred distinction in this
study between those who had a suitable person
‘decide for them’ about their indirect payment, and
those who had simply consented and asked another
person to manage their money for them.
Deciding that a person lacks capacity
A best interests decision can only be made for some-
one who lacks capacity to make that decision (The
Mental Capacity Act, 2005), so the second decision
point we explore is that of the assessment of capacity
to decide whether or not to take up a DP.
The language and principles of the MCA
Most of the practitioners interviewed apparently
understood and adhered to the MCA’s principles and
were aware that assessing capacity was their respon-
sibility. Many were very clear about the decision-spe-
ciﬁc nature of capacity. This practitioner understood
the importance of seeing a person on more than one
occasion:
Does the person have the ability to understand the informa-
tion, in the format, is there a different format, is [capacity]
ﬂuctuating, could she understand it next week if we pre-
sented it in a different way? (P1)
Practitioners also appeared to be aware of the sec-
ond principle of the MCA, which requires that all
possible support be given to help people make their
own decisions. A practitioner described how a meet-
ing with a man with learning disabilities took place
in a familiar environment, it was: ‘an informal meet-
ing at home . . . with the parents’ (P38).
Assessing capacity to consent or to manage?
The 2009 regulations specify that the decision about
which the person’s capacity should be assessed is
their ability to consent to a DP (distinct from their
ability to manage it). As the guidance states:
Councils should not confuse whether somebody has the
capability to manage direct payments with whether they
have the mental capacity to consent to such payments. (DH
2009, p. 26)
This was an area that appeared to cause confusion.
A common theme reﬂected the challenges practitioners
experienced in specifying what decision they were
assessing capacity for. It was apparent that a lack of
understanding about the micro-level of ﬁnancial man-
agement was the most common reason for practitio-
ners assessing that people lacked capacity. One
described how he showed a person ‘. . .pictures of
money, pictures of a bank [and] invoices. . .’ (P26). This
lack of understanding of the detail led practitioners to
assess that people may not have an understanding of
‘what direct payments are all about’ (P32).
Suitable people’s understanding of capacity assessment
According to the MCA, suitable people might expect
to be consulted and involved at the point of any
capacity assessment, as they would know the person
well. However, most suitable people had not noticed
a capacity assessment happening, exempliﬁed by SP9.
This parent recalled that the MCA had been men-
tioned in discussions with practitioners, but was
uncertain whether or not her son’s capacity to con-
sent to a DP had been assessed.
In a small number of cases, practitioners expressed
to the suitable person their judgement about the
person’s capacity. However, this appears to reinforce
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the conﬂation between an assessment of a person’s
capacity to consent to a DP with their capacity to man-
age one, as in this case, of the parent of a man with a
learning disability:
I mean they have said, you need to manage this on his behalf,
because obviously he’s not able to do it himself. (SP10)
From the evidence we had from suitable people,
their understanding of assessment of capacity was, at
the least, confused. Many described assessments of
need, when asked about capacity, and others described
impairment assessments, such as dementia assess-
ments. It would seem that this aspect of the MCA had
not been explained clearly to most of the suitable
people in our study.
Deciding whether an indirect payment is in the
person’s best interests
Each individual is different
Where a person is assessed as lacking capacity to
make a decision, decisions made on their behalf must
be made in their best interests (Department for Con-
stitutional Affairs 2007). Therefore, at this stage of the
process, we expected to see a decision about whether
an indirect payment is in the best interests of the per-
son. This manager summarised his exemplary under-
standing of when and how this principle should
initially be followed:
Before you even think about a suitable person, you have to
make a decision that making an indirect payment is in the
best interests of this person. And when you’re making a BI
decision in favour of one option, you have to be able to
articulate why you’ve ruled out other options . . . then, hav-
ing decided that it’s appropriate, then you have to ﬁnd a
suitable person. (P33)
Making a best interests decision should focus on
the individual person’s preferences, needs and values,
and therefore a rounded picture has to be gained by
consulting with a wide range of people. Another
practitioner described the implication of this – that
care managers do not always know best:
Best interests . . . it’s a difﬁcult concept isn’t it? It varies
from person to person. What I may feel is in someone’s best
interests may not be. So you’ve got to rely on a wider range
of people, who would then maybe give you a more holistic
picture. (P32)
Whose best interests?
Suitable people were rarely aware that a best interests
decision had been made, nor that it was because
of this process that they had the role of ‘suitable
person’.
However, several suitable people had used their
personal knowledge of the needs and preferences
of their relative, and reached the conclusion about
an indirect payment because of those individ-
ual requirements. A more ‘formalised’ process was
taken by the mother of a man with learning
disabilities. She planned with his circle of support
for when he left residential college, understanding
the importance of his ‘safety’ and security within
the community:
He needed to live where people knew him, where he knew
people, where he felt safe and secure . . . so we started off
with a circle of support. (SP13)
As suitable people often also acted as informal ca-
rers, the best interests of the disabled person were
closely connected with the ‘best interests’ of the suit-
able person. One indirect payment was being used to
pay for a man with a learning disability to be sup-
ported to visit weekend activity sessions. Prior to
receiving the indirect payment, his mother had
accompanied him on these sessions. Therefore, the
outcome for the son was greater independence from
his mother, and the outcome for the mother was that
she had a break from her caring role.
Deciding who the suitable person will be
The family member
The DH (2009) guidance acknowledges that:
Direct payments in respect of someone who lacks the capac-
ity to consent, [are] only possible if there is an appropriate
and willing ‘suitable person’ to receive the direct payments
on their behalf. (DH 2009, p. 22)
Hence, for those lacking capacity, the decision to
take an indirect payment depends on a suitable per-
son being available. It may seem inevitable, therefore,
that these decision points will be conﬂated and this
may partly explain the lack of awareness among suit-
able people that an ‘ofﬁcial’ best interests procedure
had been followed. Almost universally, practitioners
described how they would pinpoint a suitable person
on the basis of them being close to the person lacking
capacity. This is in keeping with the message in the
guidance:
In most cases, the suitable person will be a family member
or close friend already involved in the provision of care for
the person concerned. (DH 2009, p. 65)
In some instances, the parental role was assumed to
be the key one: ‘if it’s at transition . . . then normally
it’ll be the parents’ (P4). Others were more robust in
their identiﬁcation process, describing how they would
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spend time getting to know the circumstances of the
person lacking capacity and ﬁnding out for example,
who was ‘consistent in their life’ (P9).
The only ‘suitable person’ available
The majority of suitable people here wholly agreed
that they had been the most appropriate person to
take on that role. None considered that there was any
viable alternative available. In six cases, they had a
lasting power of attorney for the person lacking
capacity, and so equated their role with that power.
This, of course is in keeping with the recommenda-
tion in the 2009 guidance which notes that if a person
is a donee of lasting power of attorney, they are
likely to fulﬁl the SP role (DH 2009).
Deciding on how the indirect payment will be used
The ﬁnal decision stage is that at which the support
plan has to be decided on; again, this stage may well
happen simultaneously with others in this paper, but
it is useful to consider it separately, as the best inter-
ests of the person lacking capacity should be central
to decisions about how to spend the budget.
Confusion about the status of the support plan
There is an expectation that the suitable person will
work with the person lacking capacity to make deci-
sions about the type of support they want to have. In
terms of the formal support planning process, the
involvement of suitable people here was at times
incongruent with policy. Around half of the suitable
people spoke about support planning. They described
bad practice, from support plans being provided by
the council practitioner after a needs assessment
meeting and generic, ‘cut and paste’ plans without
any assessment of the person lacking capacity, to a
complete absence of a plan:
The social worker . . . said, ‘Oh don’t worry with your fancy
support plans, all we’re interested in is the money bit at the
back’. (SP7)
Making personalised decisions
Although there was limited awareness of ‘ofﬁcial’
support plans, suitable people had all developed
packages based on their relative’s speciﬁc needs and
preferences. For instance, SP16 knew that her son
was interested in maritime history, and so she
engaged a personal assistant with similar interests.
Another knew that her mother wished to continue
smoking in her own home, so engaged personal assis-
tants who understood this, and would be prepared to
support the woman to continue to smoke.
Reviewing and monitoring the indirect payment
Despite the delegation of best interests decision-mak-
ing to the suitable person, the local authority retains
the responsibility to monitor and review what is hap-
pening. The guidance pays particular attention to the
level of monitoring in these situations:
Adults lacking capacity are likely to need more frequent
monitoring arrangements than other direct payment recipi-
ents . . . Councils should be satisﬁed at all times that the
suitable person is using the direct payments in a way that
protects the best interests of the service recipient. (DH 2009,
p. 82)
However, this overall review of best interests was
not evident. Instead, we found that local authorities
typically prioritised monitoring the ﬁnancial execu-
tion of indirect payments. In many cases, the only
contact between the suitable person and a social work
practitioner was in an annual review meeting. As this
practitioner described, the annual review allowed for
scrutiny of both ﬁnancial and support elements of the
package:
. . .we try to get the annual audit done just prior to the
annual review due date. So that it is part of the review as
to whether or not the package is running properly isn’t it?
And not only is it giving the ﬁnancial picture, it actually
tells us if they’re having the support . . . it’s another safe-
guard to inform the review. . . (P2)
However, other practitioners described mecha-
nisms in place for more regular review of indirect
payments, particularly in the ﬁrst months of suitable
people taking that responsibility.
The perception among suitable people was that
the only scrutiny of the indirect payment was ﬁnan-
cial. While on the one hand they were happy to bene-
ﬁt from this ‘arms length’ approach to monitoring,
they did also express concern that they had lost touch
with social workers:
I would’ve said maybe 3 months in, or 4 months in. How
are things going? Any problems? Is there anything you
want to talk to us about? . . . you know just general health
checks . . . So yeah I think there should be, but nobody’s
been in touch. (SP4)
Discussion
Although this paper has separated out ﬁve ‘key’ deci-
sion points in setting up an indirect payment, in prac-
tice, people moved back and forwards between the
different elements. For instance, the ﬁrst discussion
following an assessment of needs will often be with
the ‘suitable person’, who takes on this role by
accepting the offer of an indirect payment. Therefore,
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the identiﬁcation of the suitable person is often car-
ried out before the consideration of whether or not
the indirect payment is in the best interests of the
person lacking capacity. To some extent, this conﬂa-
tion of the processes is inevitable. However, our data
revealed how easy it is to miss some of the essential
elements of an indirect payment, particularly those
which focus on the individual disabled person, such
as the assessment of capacity and the identiﬁcation of
best interests.
There was often a discrepancy between what prac-
titioners describe as happening (which in the main
appeared to be well-informed practice), and the
descriptions from suitable people. Maybe this is sim-
ply due to lack of familiarity with the terminology of
the MCA, and it is arguable how far one would wish
suitable people to become micro-professionals. How-
ever, 3 years after the implementation of this legisla-
tion, it appears that there may still be a gap between
rhetoric and practice.
Previous research about the MCA (Williamson et al.
2012) has shown that capacity can seem a ‘blurred’
concept, and a difﬁcult one for practitioners to
approach. As capacity has to be assessed on a ‘deci-
sion-speciﬁc’ basis, perhaps the greatest difﬁculty in
the current study lay in identifying what that speciﬁc
decision was. How does one actually know if a person
lacks capacity to ‘consent’, and conversely, what
would a person have to demonstrate, to show that they
have capacity to consent? This question was never
answered clearly; instead, practitioners were veering
towards assessing the ability of a person to ‘manage’,
by testing whether they understood money. There was
an unclear distinction made between appointing a suit-
able person, and enabling someone to help and sup-
port with the management of a budget.
The question then arises about whether this lack
of clarity matters. Returning to the key principles of
the personalisation agenda, indirect payments are
clearly now including those who lack capacity in var-
ious ways, and as such, are extending to them the
ability to have personalised services that meet their
individual needs. They are also, as suitable people in
this study pointed out, keeping their relatives and
friends away from services that they consider inﬂexi-
ble or undesirable. One of the hallmarks of personali-
sation has always been the call to reduce bureaucracy
(DH 2008, 2012), and indirect payments processes
perhaps do not need to re-introduce unnecessary
trails of paperwork. Slasberg et al. (2013) questioned
the efﬁcacy of the systems introduced with personal
budgets and self-directed support, claiming that
the ‘choice and control’ experienced by those using
adult social care is largely ‘making use of the direct
payment provisions of the 1990s’ (2014, p. 93). The
current study reinforces that point, showing how
suitable people can manage the system in a straight-
forward, common-sense way.
The litmus test of indirect payments, however,
should be the type of ‘relational autonomy’ described
by Leece and Peace (2010), where a person relies on
others to make big decisions in their life. Choice and
control within the personalisation agenda seldom
does mean total individual autonomy, as argued by
Houston (2010). However, where a suitable person is
enabled to make decisions on a day-to-day basis for
the person lacking capacity, there is a need to ensure
that the individual’s best interests remain at the cen-
tre of the support.
By way of caveat, we acknowledge here the limi-
tations of this study. The majority of our sample com-
prised people who were already receiving social care
funding and were dissatisﬁed with provision. In dis-
cussions with practitioners, it was acknowledged that
while they routinely made an offer of a DP to all new
social care recipients, there existed a backlog of peo-
ple who historically received care through a managed
service and had not been offered the option of more
personalised funding. Therefore, a bias that was
introduced related to the knowledge and attitude of
the suitable persons involved. They generally saw
DPs as a positive, and were prepared to defend
the way it worked for them and for the person they
supported.
Conclusion
The extension of DPs to people who lack capacity
must remain focused on their best interests, which
generally includes the ‘best interests’ of their family
members and friends. Without this, indirect payments
can be seen as a cost-cutting exercise, where family
members are being asked to perform the functions of
the local authority without any formal recognition or
recompense, which may not be sustainable in the
longer term (Coles 2013). Further, a system which
devolves so much responsibility to individual family
members and friends inevitably raises important
questions about the balance between citizenship, wel-
fare provision and family-led care. Maybe, as Dowse
(2009) argued, there are some people who cannot
manage to have an autonomous voice or to be full,
economically active citizens. Moreover, the beneﬁts of
DPs may be accruing chieﬂy to those who have a
‘suitably’ skilled enabler, potentially excluding vast
numbers of people whose families do not have the
necessary skills to manage a budget. This paper
started with a critical question about the tension
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inherent in personalisation, heralded both as the
answer to independent living, but also as eroding the
welfare state. We must remain vigilant about the
place of indirect payments within this balance, and
ensure not only that suitable people have a stronger
voice, but also that the best interests and ‘relational
autonomy’ of those receiving adult social care remain
at the heart of the process.
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